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Abstract
Europe’s power system is still marked by a distinct national component, and despite some
regions with strongly integrated power systems, electricity supply today still has a largely
national basis. Policies to decarbonise the power sector may fundamentally alter this
situation, because power generation from renewable, carbon-neutral sources may require
large, flexible, and heterogenic power pools as backdrop for efficient operation. Integration
of little or non-integrated parts of the European power system is therefore a key element
for the successful transition of the European power sector towards more renewables. But a
development which fosters integration, growing transmission distances and bigger
markets will likely lead to a reshuffling of allocation of power generation capacity in
Europe. As with any fundamental policy change, decarbonisation of the power sector will
create new winners and losers. Moreover, an integrated power system will probably cause
new dependencies on the good-will of neighbouring countries. Europe is hence confronted
with a ‘catch-22’: On the one hand, policy makers see the advantages of renewables and the
exploitation of domestic energy resources, yet the necessary adaptations of power
generation, distribution and consumption implies the risk of ‘harming’ the national power
sector. EU policies to increase renewables and to create an internal energy market (IEM)
thus aim at ameliorating this situation by e.g. both stimulating construction of renewable
energy infrastructure and creating more interconnectors between member states. But due
to various interests at the national level, member states’ levels of ambitions in contributing
to achieving these overarching targets vary a lot. The instruments the European Union has
at her hands will therefore have to be refined if the reluctance of member states to
integrate power systems is to be overcome.
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1. EU’s decarbonisation agenda: Past achievements, future
constraints
Five years ago, in October 2009, the European heads of state and government agreed on
an ambitious long-term climate policy objective in order to prevent dangerous
anthropogenic interference with the climate system and to ensure the European Union
(EU) plays its part in limiting global temperature increases to 2°C (European Council
2009). European policy makers therefore decided to bring the European Union on a
demanding decarbonisation path, with the objective to develop instruments to reduce
greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions by between 80 and 95 per cent by 2050 (European
Commission 2011a), as compared to 1990 levels. National policies in many member
states aim in the same direction, as the examples of Germany, Denmark and Sweden
show (e.g. DEA 2014, MSD 2005, Sattich 2014).
Energy policy is one of the main fields in this regard (see IPCC 2014), as decarbonisation
of the economy in only a few decades implies a major and swift transformation of the
energy sector towards almost zero GHG emissions. In an attempt to define a common
framework for the future evolution of the energy sector, the European Union therefore
developed and implemented a diverse set of policies. Decarbonisation became part of
these policies only recently, yet despite its short history, it is particularly important, as it
provides an overarching narrative which focuses earlier elements of EU energy policy on
the aim of limiting the use of fossil fuels to an absolute minimum. Decarbonisation can
therefore be described as a strategic factor which guides EU energy policies towards the
overarching goals of near to zero CO2 emissions.
The power sector plays a fundamental role in this context, as it represented about 37
per cent of the total CO2 emissions in Europe in 2012, and is believed to be one of the
sectors where decarbonisation could take place in the quickest and most economical
way (Roques 2014, p. 82). This requires a large-scale renewables expansion in order to
substitute fossil fuels in electricity generation. Accordingly, large-scale use of carbonneutral renewables is one of the key elements of EU’s decarbonisation agenda. Different
indicators show that the mix of energy sources that supply industry, transport and
households with the necessary power, is indeed in transition. Renewable power has
increased massively during the last decade in particular in Europe; the result is that the
contribution of carbon-neutral renewable energy (RE) grew by about 64 per cent since
2004, so that renewables in 2012 already accounted for about 24 per cent of electricity
3

generation (EUROSTAT energy statistics). With expected faster electrification of other
sectors, including industry, transport and buildings (Sugiyama 2012), the power sector’s
contribution to decarbonisation is likely to grow further.
Given the significant increase of renewables (as well as their positive prospects1), and
the relative decline of carbon-based energy carriers (see Fig. 1), the European
decarbonisation agenda hence seems be on track(see Fig. 2). If this trend continues,
renewables will cover an ever more significant share of Europe’s energy mix and
relatively soon deliver a main part of the future energy supply (see also European
Commission 2011a).
Yet today conventional2 plants still largely define the logic of power systems. The latter
are designed to provide a technical and economic environment that is adapted to the
needs of these power stations. The adaptation of conventional plant-dominated power
pools to the use of renewables will be one of the major impediments for the further
increase of RE with today’s technologies (see European Commission 2012, pp. 6-9),
because a fundamental change in the economical and technical logic of power
generation (such as the large scale integration of renewables) affects the existing system
as such, and hence requires subsequent and more or less costly adaptations (for
technical details see section 2). Thus, politicians, grid system operators, power
companies and other relevant actors have to assess the trend towards more renewables
with great caution.
In fact, a deeper analysis shows that the integration of renewables into the established
power pools, and with it the transition of Europe’s power system towards
decarbonisation, is about to enter a new and critical phase. Renewables are about to
reach a share in the power system significant enough to require fundamental
adaptations of the established structures of power generation, transmission and
consumption mentioned above, if new RE generating facilities are to operate at their full
capacity. In some member states, e.g. Germany, where renewables are outcompeting gas
and nuclear power stations, this point maybe reached (Bloomberg 2014; ISE 2015).

The 2020 targets for the domestic use of renewables set out by the Renewables Directive (Directive
2009/28/EC), e.g. on average 20% by 2020 might very well be over fulfilled (see EEA 2014 and
Commission 2014a).
2 Carbon-based (e.g. coal, gas, oil) and low-carbon (e.g. hydro, nuclear), dispatchable and centralised
power plants.
1
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Figure 1: Development of different energy carriers in the EU-28 from 2000-2012 (EU gross inland energy
consumption by fuel type (1000 tonnes of oil equivalent), 2000 = 100 per cent)
Source: EUROSTAT energy statistics
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Fig. 2: Greenhouse gas emission intensity of energy consumption in the EU-28, 2000 = 100 per cent)
Source: EUROSTAT energy statistics.

Cross-border power transmission infrastructure plays an important role in this regard,
because the low interconnector capacity rather isolates than integrates power pools in
Europe. Many studies therefore point at the need for more exchange capacity in order to
increase renewables, and indicate that efficient full decarbonisation of the power sector
5

implies the need for a Europe-wide power pool (e.g. ENTSO-E 2012). The question hence
is, whether European decarbonisation policy at present has the right tools to overcome
concerns about and opposition against the integration of national power systems in
Europe into a European power pool. This working paper therefore asks:
Whether and to what extent do EUs decarbonisation policies provide the right
means to overcome the fragmentation of the European power system?
The following section therefore first examines the complex technical-economic
relationship between renewables and the (cross-border) grid infrastructure in more
depth (section 2). Based on this examination the working paper then reviews the EU
policies which aim at integrating different parts of the European power system and
adapt the power infrastructure to the technical and economical requirements of
renewables (section 3). The paper concludes with a discussion whether EU
decarbonisation policy has the right instruments at hand to overcome the geo-economic
frictions that hinder the integration of power systems in Europe into a European power
pool3 (section 4), and a number of recommendations for a coherent and effective policy
framework (section 5).

2. Power pools and their (potential) role in decarbonisation
Because storage of electricity with today’s means is difficult and costly in most European
countries, power generation generally has to follow changing load in real-time in order
to keep main voltage and grid frequency stable. Power plants therefore operate as
interacting components in integrated power pools where the different generation units
dispatch4 their power output to the momentary load.5 The role of electricity grids in
these power pools is to optimise this system, with interregional power lines providing
power system operators with the flexibility needed to keep the network stable despite
local load changes (ECF 2010, p. 70). The larger, the more flexible and diverse a power
pool is, the better a network can be stabilised, and the closer to their optimal utilization
factor (e.g. full capacity or optimal profit) individual plants can operate (Sattich 2014).
A power pool consists of two or more facilities who combine their resources to better meet their
individual needs. These resources can include generating facilities, transmission system access,
emergency response capability and even accounting and billing databases. This pooling of resources
allows utilities to keep costs low and insure higher reliability through "strength in numbers". Pooling is an
accepted, desirable and often mandatory efficiency strategy in regulated energy markets, but in
deregulated markets it is usually a voluntary activity (from EnergyVortex Energy Dictionary).
4 The adjustment of power output to the system’s varying demand.
5 Moment-to-moment power requirement in the system.
3
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Conventional plants still play a dominant role in these pools and thus exert a major
influence on the structure and logic of the entire system. The technical features of
intermittent renewables such as wind and solar divert, however, partly from those of
conventional plants, and disturb their interactions. For older conventional plants it may
be difficult and costly to balance the quick fluctuations of wind and solar (see e.g.
Schaber, Steinke & Hamacher 2012, p. 123). Moreover, renewables6 tend to outcompete
conventional plants, but in many cases the latter are obliged by regulating authorities to
stay online in order to ensure generation capacity in the times when there is little wind
or sun. Decarbonisation of the power sector does thus not only consist of replacement of
old power generation units with new, carbon-neutral ones, but also, generally requires
the reorganisation of the power pools in which renewables operate (see e.g. Schaber et
al. 2012). 7 Consequently, from a certain level on renewables either dictate the logic of
those power pools they are integrated in (and the required reorganisation/adaptation),
or cannot deliver their full potential.
Power grids play a fundamental role in this context, as they are the prerequisite for
flexible, interactive operation of power plants, for the efficient allocation of generation
units over a given territory, and for the interconnection between sites of generation and
consumption. Several studies therefore point at the importance of the power
transmission and distribution infrastructure for the switch to renewables. They
conclude that European power grids need to be adapted, otherwise extensive
decarbonisation will be much more difficult or expensive to achieve and/or delayed
while waiting for other technological options such as storage (see for example Tröster,
Kuwahata & Ackermann 2011). Intelligent systems to predict loads, smart grids (Capros
et al. 2012, p. 96), smart meters and a densely intermeshed electricity transmission grid
are widely believed to be key elements of the necessary adaptation (Fürsch et al. 2013,
p. 642). Big data, analytics, cloud-based technology, and the internet of things are all
making contributions to a smarter energy system, which is likely to revolutionise the
energy sector (Bowden 2014).
For grid operators, calculating predicted needs for grid improvement in a longer time
perspective has, however, become a hard task, as future grid demand depends on many
Often RE power generation is subsidised/supported.
Different forms of renewables differ, however, largely with regard to their dispatchability and
centralisation, and thus in their impact on the power system.
6
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factors that are difficult to estimate. Factors include the level of technical development
and prices of renewables infrastructure, what neighbour countries will do in terms of
connecting themselves the other neighbouring markets, weather conditions etc. In
addition, some places, whole villages are deciding to go off the central electricity grid or
reverse the traditional roles, such as in the German town Wildpoldsried, which produces
five times more electricity than it consumes (Energytransition 2014). Moreover, grid
development has to adapt to the trend where a growing proportion of consumers are
becoming prosumers, which means that consumers are both producing their own
electricity (from e.g. rooftop solar panels) and regulate their own demand more
efficiently (e.g. Eid et al. 2014).
This poses several questions of technical, economic, legal and political nature: What kind
of power generation units will and should be built, where, at what size, and when? What
may be needed in terms of infrastructure upgrades? What sorts of drivers and barriers
are in place? How are policy developments in the EU responding to such challenges? And
how will the European power system develop under the framework of EU and national
decarbonisation/energy policies? In order to answer some of these questions, the
following sections aim to provide a better understanding of the organisation and
operation of power pools, especially with regard to cross-border interactions (section
2.1), and to describe the complex relationship between the renewables in this
environment (section 2.2), as well as the necessary reorganisation of the European grid
(section 2.3).

2.1 From isolated electricity systems to a European super-grid?
At the very beginning of electrification at the end of the 19th century, power systems in
Europe were locally organised and isolated. They consisted of a number of small plants
in major cities such as Berlin or London, serving the illumination of individual streets or
the electrification of small factories or workshops. Yet the new technology advanced
quickly, and technical progress soon enabled transmission distances over hundreds of
kilometres at relatively low losses and costs. Until the early 20th century the original
power circuits therefore expanded from the city centres to the suburbs, and from plants
closer to coal and hydro resources located far outside urban centres into the cities
(Lagendijk and van der Vleuten 2013, pp. 64-66).

8

Moreover, technical standardisation enabled the interconnection of formerly isolated
systems of independent plants (and companies) to more complex power pools. This step
towards heterogenic power pools which integrated different plants in one system,
resulted in a better economic mix, with greater security of supply and less generation
capacity overcapacities (for details on this step in the early days of power systems, see:
Hughes 1993). As a result the early power pools quickly expanded to include a growing
number of interacting, complementary elements such as different plants (with varying
characteristics, e.g. availability) and consumption centres (with different loads, e.g. peak
demand).
But even though complex power pools turned out to be a big advantage compared to the
earlier, isolated systems, they remained largely local/regional/sub-national in the first
half of the 20th century. Where first cross-border electricity transmission lines emerged,
they served local purposes only. But with the possible transmission distances becoming
longer, the question arose, what the optimal dimension of the power system would be.
The reflections of plans for the future power system therefore soon got a transnational,
and even European dimension (Lagendijk 2008, p. 80). In this regard it is remarkable,
that the added value of a European continental super-grid – coupling plants and major
consumption centres all over Europe by means of large-scale grid expansion and the
construction of an European overlay network – was already under discussion in the
1920s and 1930s (see Hughes 1983, and Lagendijk 2008, see also section 3.1).
The underlying reasoning of this early debate was threefold: technical (1), economic (2),
and political (3):
1. Interconnection between different sorts of plants such as coal and hydro on the
one hand, and different consumption centres on the other, has large advantages
over simple circuits with only one or a limited number of plants with similar
characteristics.

Combination

of

different

load

factors

with

plants

of

complementary characteristics allows a more rational use of material,
infrastructure and resources.
2. A European system was therefore regarded as the most economically rational
solution, particularly during the Great Depression, with engineers discussing the
potential of such a transnational electric power system.
3. Debated on different layers of the international system, for example in the League
of Nations as an alternative to a purely national development, the early
9

deliberations of the future European power system and the potential of an overlay
network had a distinct political aspect. It featured a clearly Europeanist undertone
and was favoured by the young European movement that promoted the idea of
supranational cooperation.
The respective arguments arguably largely resemble those of today’s debates. Thus,
even though debates about the added value of super-grids, interconnection, and the
benefits of different forms of electricity generation appear to be of recent date, they
actually date back to the first half of the 20th century.
The evolvement of state and sector interests after the Second World War brought these
debates, however, to an end; instead of a European super-grid, an axis between power
companies and the nation state emerged that became the most prominent feature of
Europe’s post-war power system (Van der Vleuten and Lagendijk 2010, see also below).
The power system thus remained a national prerogative, and energy policy remained
under strong influence (or even in the hands) of vertically integrated, in many cases
state-owned power companies which had monopolies in power production and
transmission on the national (or sub-national) level.
Even though power transmission infrastructure could have been a potential prime
candidate for a common European policy following the Second World War, national
thinking prevailed, and energy policy turned out to remain one of the policies where the
nation states prioritized sovereignty to the largest extent.8 Together the national
perspective of policy makers on energy related issues, the tight ties between policy
makers and power companies and their economic rationale, hence blocked new
initiatives to Europeanise the power system. Consequently, the Rome Treaty of 1957,
which established the European Economic Community (hereafter Community), did not
include electricity (Meeus, Purchala & Belmans 2005, p. 26),9 and the Community
institutions merely remained an additional player in this context.
Moreover, the focus of the state-company axis rested on national markets and
investments in the national power systems. Cross-border integration therefore not only
evolved outside the framework of the emerging Community (Van der Vleuten and
Lagendijk 2010), but had low prominence amongst policy makers and managers, and
See for example the failure of the 1974 Council resolution concerning a new energy policy strategy for
the community to produce results (European Council 1974).
9 Electricity was considered a service.
8
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was only a secondary aspect in the overall evolution of the European power system.
Rather than being a key element in the emerging European power system, and despite
the fact that interconnection of plants and consumption centres was possible over
hundreds of kilometres without significant transmission losses, cross-border
interconnectors were hence merely constructed gradually and on an ad-hoc basis.
As a result, interconnection capacities to import/export electricity between
neighbouring countries generally remained very low. In other words: Despite some
pockets along borders, where the national power systems of neighbouring countries
have been interconnected and thus interacting with each other, each European country
developed its own power system, with an infrastructure and sufficient generation
capacity to supply its own economy and population with electricity (Van der Vleuten
and Lagendijk 2010). The underlying political and economic conditions of this
fragmented European system stayed largely unchallenged until the 1980s, and the
European power system still reflects the strong role of the state-company axis on the
one hand, and weak Community involvement on the other.
But even though the economic rationale of utilities and the national perspective of policy
makers largely prevailed over the idea of a top-down implemented European power
system (Van der Vleuten & Lagendijk 2010, p. 2045), the dualism between the statecompany axis and the supranational approach to the development of power systems in
Europe never fully disappeared and can be traced through the decades (Lagendijk 2008,
pp. 80ff.; see also section 3.1). Moreover, some countries proceeded with international
integration of power systems on their own initiative, resulting in international power
pools such as Nordpool (the Nord Pool Spot stock exchange for the Swedish and
Norwegian markets was established in 1996) in Scandinavia, which is the world’s first
international power market (Newbery et al. 2013, p. 12).
The generally low integration of power systems in Europe does hence not imply that
there is no integration of national power systems today. Cross-border interconnections
exist between most neighbouring countries, and in some regions the power
transmission infrastructure has significant exchange capacity. Beyond the Scandinavian
countries, the German-Dutch couple would be an example for such a high level of
integration. But these regions/countries are selective exemptions, and only mark one
extreme of the spectrum. Other regions/countries show low capacities for cross-border
exchange of electricity relatively compared to the installed generation capacity. An
11

example for such a situation is be the French-Spanish border, where a significant
increase of capacity for electricity exchange could be possible, but has not achieved the
last decades10. This and other comparable cases hence mark the spectrum’s opposite
extreme.
In between of these extreme examples a heterogenic group of cases can be located with
varying levels of (relatively low) interconnection. As an example for this group may
serve the Central European case, where large cross-border flows of electricity occur at
peak hours of wind power generated in Northern Germany, which threaten to
overcharge Polish and Czech grids. In this particular case the power flows are not only
erratic and unplanned, but also not welcome by the receiving side, which therefore is
planning the construction of technical installation to block them (see Puka and Szulecki
2014).
In sum the power system in Europe can be described as a heterogenic patchwork of
integrated and mostly not (so well) integrated components of still largely national
power systems. In general the situation is hence such that cross-border interconnection
is relatively low compared to the installed power generation capacities. More
interconnection could be possible and has been subject to political discussions during
the last decades, but large scale interconnection has not been achieved yet. Exchange
between the different national systems therefore seemingly has stagnated at 7-10 per
cent (ENTSO-E online electricity exchange data, see Fig. 3)11. With generally low Net
Transfer Capacity values, today’s power transmission infrastructure in Europe can
therefore only partly be described as European, and hence rather prevents free flow of
electricity in Europe than to promote it.

This situation might be, at least, somewhat altered/ameliorated, with the ongoing land interconnector
and the new planned interconnector under the ocean between Spain and France.
11 This situation will likely be ameliorated with the gradual expansion of interconnections outlined in the
list of the projects of common interest (PCIs) in the years to come.
10
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Fig. 3: Generation, consumption, and exchange of electricity across borders in Europe, 2003 – 2012
Source: ENTSO-E energy statistics

2.2 The power system and decarbonisation
In view of current trends in the power system it is estimated that about 80 per cent of
the existing gaps and bottlenecks in the European power system relate to the integration
of renewables (ENTSO-E 2012, p. 56). Many of the necessary projects have a crossborder dimension (ENTSO-E 2012, p. 91). Notwithstanding the underlying reasons for
this situation, it compels the involved countries to maintain power supply on a national
basis. In turn this leads to inefficiencies, larger reserve capacities than necessary,
significant overcapacities, and – most importantly with regard to the topic under
discussion here – key-holes between RES and load centres (ENTSO-E 2012, p. 56). In
other words, the historical structure of power grids in Europe causes today’s inefficient
distribution of RE generation units and net welfare losses when compared to an optimal
situation seen from a European point of view.
Without adaptations of the cross-border interconnection capacity even the bigger
national systems may seem to be too narrow to serve as basis for the large-scale
integration of renewables. Stronger integration on the other hand should – half by
directly connecting RE, and half by accommodating inter-area imbalances triggered by
RE (ENTSO-E 2012, p. 66) – avoid present congestion to worsen and new congestion to
appear (ENTSO-E 2012, p. 56). It would thus lead to the more rapid phasing in of RE
13

power generation units close to their full capacity, improved security of supply and
hence lower reserve and overcapacities. The EU’s decarbonisation agenda thus involves
initiatives to increase interconnectivity between national systems (see European
Council 2014).
The pressure RE power generation puts on the established power pools varies, however,
with the specific type and the location of generating capacity. Measures to adapt the grid
infrastructure will therefore differ from region to region. Decarbonisation thus poses a
double challenge for the European power transmission infrastructure:
1. The energy source co-determines the location of power plants. The switch to
renewables will hence change the distribution of power plants and hence the
topography of the grid.
2. The product of electricity generation changes with decarbonisation. In contrast
to carbon-based systems, where standardised units of coal, oil or gas make the
power system partially independent from meteorological effects, many RE plants
depend on changing elemental forces such as wind and sun. Grid modernisation
(e.g. smart grids and smart technologies such as the coupling of power
transmission and telecommunication networks) may thus be required to stabilise
power supply.
The changing topography of the European power grid
The relatively low energy density of many RE sources will require installations to be
dispersed over large territories. Wind parks, for example, will have to be developed and
interconnected. Second, these installations are likely to be further from the centres of
consumption. As most renewables cannot rely on modern transport systems to bring the
energy source to the plant, power transmission infrastructure will have to cover
growing transmission distances in order to bring the electricity to the consumer. Other
technologies such as small scale wind turbines, solar heaters and solar cells are,
however, located close to or directly at the point of consumption and might thus reduce
demand for increased grid capacity. These are contradictory trends, but as the
distribution of renewable energy sources tend to be unequal,12 decarbonisation is likely

Load hours of solar- and wind power between the most and least favourable sites in Europe vary by
factors up to 100 per cent (see Fürsch et al. 2013:650), but rapid cost degression of e.g. photovoltaic
power will likely lead to instalments at sites which today seem uneconomical.
12
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to result in a much more unequal distribution of generation sites than it is the case
today, and thus to the need for new grid infrastructure.
Moreover, there are differences between the various forms of renewables. While wind,
solar and tidal power tend to be highly concentrated in geographic areas that do not
coincide with consumption centres, biomass can (partly) be transported to and used in
the power generation infrastructure in place (such as in combined heat and power
plants (CHP). The impact on the grid will thus vary largely between different regions
and greatly depend on the regional energy mix. With the increasing use of electric
vehicles to transport energy from one site to the next the picture will likely become
further complicated. On the other hand, electrification of road transport may also make
energy systems more flexible, because the car batteries can also serve as valuable
battery capacity which are filled when the electricity prices are low and can refill
electricity into the grid again when prices are high, thus contributing to stabilization of
the electricity systems (Loisel, Pasaoglu & Thiel 2014).
The impact of intermittent renewables on the grid
Not only the changing location of generation sites, but also the changing product of
power generation will have strong implications for the future shape of the European
power grid. According to estimations of the International Energy Agency (IEA) and the
European Commission, existing power pools are flexible enough to counterbalance five
per cent of intermittent renewables such as wind and solar power in the system
(European Commission 2012, p. 8). Where, however, intermittent RE exceeds this
margin, additional measures, tools and technological innovations are required to
provide the system with enough flexibility to absorb network fluctuations. ‘The
necessary measures depend largely on the given local configuration of electricity grids,
the interaction between grid operators, the generation mix, the availability of backup
generation capacities and the level of cross-border interconnection’ (Faure-Schuyer
2014, p.1).13
In this regard, the European power system is close to a paradigm shift. In 2011,
intermittent renewables already amounted to 35 per cent of RE-generated electricity in
2011 (nine per cent in 2002), and seven per cent of all electricity generated (Eurostat
The larger, for example, the share of biogas, bio-liquids and biomass as energy carriers for electricity
generation in a particular area, the better energy input and power output potentially can be controlled.
More biomass hence may imply less infrastructure adaptation and expansion.
13
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online data). It can be expected that this number will climb to 49.7 per cent of RE
capacity by 2020 (ECN 2011b, p. 14, see Fig. 4 and 5);14 if this trend continues
intermittent RE will hence account for a total of 17-20 per cent of European electricity
by 2020 (ECN 2011a). And, as most of today’s conventional plants will be
decommissioned in the next decades, much of this generating capacity needs to be
replaced.

2005

2010

2020

Fig. 4 EU members exceeding 5 per cent intermittent renewables in the power system in 2005, 2010, and
2020
Source: Renewable Energy Projections as Published in the National Renewable Energy Action Plans of the
European Member States (ECN 2011a)

The EU’s power sector is thus headed towards an era where the characteristics of
intermittent renewables will increasingly determine the logic of power generation,
transmission and consumption. Increasing the flexibility of existing power pools and
their transformation to a smart and flexible system is the key to the sector’s further
decarbonisation, and – in the long run – a complete switch to renewables. This situation
will potentially pose a brilliant opportunity for political entrepreneurs who are trying to
make governments decide on subsidizing particular technologies 15 . But with its
capability to integrate otherwise isolated regions, and thereby to increase the capacity
to keep growing network fluctuations under the control of systems operators, the power
grid has a vital role to play in this adaptation. The need for more flexibility in particular
areas depends, however, on the specific regional energy mix and how the energy
carriers there operate together.

The potential of hydropower, the most important non-intermittent form of renewables, is already to a
large extent realised; this form of RES will therefore probably lose its relative share within the power mix
in the future.
15 This already seems to be the case for the companies lobbying for nuclear technology. Already, the
governments in Finland (Olkiluoto 3) and in the UK (Hinkley Point C) have decided to expand their
production capacity by subsidizing the construction of nuclear reactors which are much more costly than
alternative sources of energy in terms of their levelized cost of production.
14
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Figure 5: Share of intermittent and non-intermittent renewables in the EU-27 (per cent of all renewablegenerated electricity).
Note: Data for 2015 and 2020 are estimates.
Source: EUROSTAT energy statistics; ECN 2011b, p. 14.

Another key element for the EU’s decarbonisation policy is possibly the introduction of
more modern gas fired power plants; these cause only low CO2 emissions and are
capable of reacting flexibly to the ups and downs caused by intermittent renewables.
Even though there is quick progress in battery technology, flexible storage facilities will
probably remain scarce for the time to come. Together with biomass, gas fired power
plants might hence remain vital to balance network fluctuations and uphold security of
supply. Their capacity in the system may possibly even have to be increased,16 if near
decarbonisation is to be reached with today’s technologies.17 New supply routes and
probably altered entry points to the European energy system will be the result, making
new infrastructure in the gas and electricity system necessary.

2.3 The reorganisation of the European power system
The European power grid has to be adapted to the requirements of renewable energies,
if decarbonisation of the European power sector is to be continued. This need for grid

Natural gas already contributed to 23 per cent of electricity generation in 2010 (9 per cent in 1990,
data: EUROSTAT).
17 With the unfolding crisis in Ukraine the future of natural gas and the respective transmission system in
Europe is, however, very much unclear.
16
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modernisation concerns different dimensions (see section 2.2), parts,18 levels19 and
most geographical sections of the grid, and can thus be described as universal20. Ideas
and plans for the reorganisation of the European grid are hence far-reaching, and
potentially include the construction of regional (e.g. North Sea countries’ North Sea Grid
Initiative), continental (the super-grid) and even transcontinental networks (for
example between North Africa and Europe). One of the options is a flexible and smart
power pool of European size, where all power plants jointly balance the disturbance of
one power station, regardless of its location (Battaglini et al. 2009).
The establishment of such a continental power pool has been regarded a convincing and
economically viable possibility for better network stabilisation (Newbery et al. 2013, pp.
86-87). Filling the gaps in the European cross-border grid infrastructure can therefore
be interpreted as largely untapped option (ibid.) for near complete decarbonisation at
moderate costs (Haller, Ludig & Bauer 2012, p. 288). The varying characteristics of
different RE technologies will, however, also pose specific challenges for particular, local
and regional sections of the power grid. Thus, the question arises, where exactly grid
development is required, what type is required, and where the necessary adaptations
are most urgent.
Per area generation of intermittent electricity is helpful to understand where
infrastructure adaptations are necessary (see Figure 5), as it reveals sharp differences
between member states in their approach to renewables. While some countries show
only a moderate density of intermittent renewables, and intend to keep their numbers
limited, other countries decided to integrate large numbers of these plants into their
national systems (ECN 2011a). This will result in largely varying need for
interconnectors with neighbouring countries. Similarly, the need for gas as an energy
carrier might increase where intermittent renewables demand balancing capacity;
Altered gas supply routes, grids, and more LNG capacity at particular sites might thus be
the result. Given that (cross-border) transmission distances and capacities will increase,
this may lead to further shifts in generation capacity.

Uptake, transmission, distribution, off-take, net metering etc.
Regional, national and international.
20 The advanced age of many parts of the European grid contributes to the necessity for universal grid
modernisation.
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Figure 6: Calculated per area generation of intermittent electricity (solar, tidal, wind) (MWh/km²).
Note: Data for 2015 and 2020 are estimates.
Source: ECN, 2011a , p. 124, 132, 142.

3. EU’s decarbonisation policy and the integration of
European power pools
The EU has several means at its disposal to affect the development of power systems in
Europe. While member states remain the right to decide on their own energy mix,21
Article 194 of the Lisbon Treaty (Treaty of the Functioning of the EU, TFEU), gives
European policy makers four different competences to influence the future shape,
organisation and working logic of power pools:


Ensuring the functioning of the energy market



Promoting the development of renewable forms of energy



Ensuring security of supply



Promoting the interconnection of networks

The adaptation of power pools to the requirements of decarbonisation rests on these
competences. This section describes in more detail what policies the European Union
developed over time on their basis (section 3.1). The integration of electricity
transmission networks is a central element in this regard, as it is the basis for market

The Court of Justice of the European Union recently confirmed this national prerogative in the Ålandcase, 1 July 2014.
21
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integration, the integration of renewables, and increased security of supply. The
respective EU policy is therefore presented separately (section 3.2).

3.1 Market integration, renewables, supply diversification – a historical
overview
The oil crises of the 1970s made energy security, supply diversification and integration
of energy systems a highly topical issues; yet their stimulus for European energy policy
was too limited to overcome the political framework that favoured development of
power systems on a national basis. It took the European Community another decade and
the Internal Market programme of the 1980s for the Community to take a more
assertive stance on energy related issues and to specify a number of key elements
necessary for the integration of energy markets. As energy markets are grid-based, the
idea of a common carrier system for electricity was one of the outcomes of this early
period of today’s European energy policy (European Commission 1988, p. 72).
This common carrier system would have included a common transit system for national
grid operators to purchase electricity across the European Community (Eikeland 2004,
pp. 4-5), and was supposed to allow power consumers to purchase electricity from any
supplier, regardless of the ownership of intermediary grids. Increasing cross-border
electricity exchange capacity in specific network bottlenecks, and a limited
Europeanisation of the existing networks were fundamental elements of this initiative
(European Commission 1988). Yet due to the strong political opposition, the common
carrier system never materialised. Instead, with the endorsement of a limited number of
high priority trans-European projects (European Council 1994), a more limited
approach became central to European policy on the power system, namely the common
development

of

certain

large-scale

energy

infrastructure

projects

such

as

interconnectors (and pipelines) categorised as being of Community interest.
The establishment of the Internal Market for Electricity (IEM) remained in the focus of
EU energy policy throughout the 1990s. During the end of the 1990s and 2000s the
focus of EU energy policy shifted, however, to sustainability. And with growing
ambitions in climate policy, and growing numbers of renewables in the system, the
question arose how to reconcile the EU’s environmental policy with the goal of creating
the Internal Electricity Market, and how the increase of renewables affects that market
(Glachant et al. 2013, pp. 68-70). Towards the end of the 1990s, the Commission
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addressed these questions in a number of papers (e.g. European Commission 1997,
European Commission 1998). They concluded that power transmission capacity
between member states was too limited for the integration of large numbers of
renewable electricity into the power system (Eikeland 2011, p. 20).
Despite this growing understanding of the technical requirements of renewables, the
promotion of renewables for policy makers at the EU-level was still mainly perceived as
support for the increase of RE generation capacity. Despite some Commission papers
pointing towards the importance of cross-border power system integration for the
operation and integration of renewables, the grid environment was still largely neglected
as an issue for RE promotion (see Fouquet & Johansson 2008). Only with regard to the
most obvious cases, such as distant wind parks, the Commission papers point out the
need for an adaptation of power systems to the particularities of renewables (European
Commission 1997, p. 29).
The low penetration of intermittent renewables in the power system at that time, may
explain the lack of deep technical analysis. Since the EU in 1997 set out the aspiration to
obtain twelve per cent of electricity from renewable sources by 2010 (EWIS 2010, p.
146), the promotion of RE moved, however, gradually further up the European agenda
(Nilson, Nilsson & Ericsson 2009, p. 4454). The gap between the importance of the
surrounding power systems for the operation of renewables, and the focus on economic
support mechanisms for new (renewable) generation capacity, started therefore to close
(European Commission 2000, p. 48). Technology-specific support for renewables
(Boasson & Wettestad 2010) became an important element of the discussions (Jansen &
Uyterlinde 2004, p. 95).22
Questions concerning the electricity transmission infrastructure, conditions for grid
access, grid reinforcement, and charges to RE generators for use of networks, thus
received more attention (Jansen & Uyterlinde 2004, p. 93). Moreover, in 2006 a major
blackout cascaded through several European countries and resulted in a renewed
debate about security of power supply (Lagendijk & van der Vleuten 2013). With the
Russia-Ukraine crises of 2006, 2009 and 2014, security of supply now is on top on the

This was not the least the case during the discussions for the Renewables Directive, where there was
very strong controversy regarding letting member states decide their own energy mix and keep their
feed-in tariff systems versus implementing an EU wide system of green certificates to support renewable
energy. In the end, the discussion/negotiations ended on the member states to decide on their own
support mechanisms (Nilson, Nilsson & Ericsson 2009, Ydersbond 2014).
22
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agenda for the national top politicians and the EU-elite (see e.g. European Commission
2014a, Ydersbond and Sveen 2014). The development of Europe’s energy networks will
therefore remain high on the EU’s political agenda.

3.2 EU grid integration programmes
The development of the cross-border power transmission infrastructure turned out to
be the central element for market integration, security of supply and the increase of
renewables. The European Union hence developed a number of grid development
programmes. These programmes can be placed in two broad categories: Policies to
provide favourable framework conditions for grid development as such, and policies to
develop specific parts of the system. Moreover, financing tools should be examined
separately.
Framework conditions for grid development
Power companies in Europe are based on a power transmission infrastructure that
converges with national boundaries. Unbundling – in other words breaking up the
vertical-integration of power companies into supply and transmission – was thought to
guarantee that investment decisions would be taken in the interest of the network
infrastructure and not that of national/regional/local utilities (Eikeland 2011, p. 32).
More cross-border interconnections and the integration of electricity markets are
assumed to be one of the results (Von Koppenfels 2010, p. 84). Unbundling can therefore
be interpreted as one of the main EU programmes to alter the framework conditions for
grid evolution and to create a European environment for the development of power
systems and markets (Eikeland 2011).
In order to guide the grid evolution process and to oversee and improve cross-border
aspects of the European power system, the European Agency for the Coordination of
Energy Regulators (ACER) and the European Network of Transmission Systems
Operators (ENTSO-E) have been set up (Regulation 714/2009). This unbundling
initiative is the most noted, but not the only European policy to develop framework
conditions of the power grid. Several other EU programmes aim at the exploration of
new energy technologies, their market-maturity, and the stimulation of their (potential)
markets, including the gigantic prestige research programme Horizon 2020 which
allocates 20 per cent of its budget to climate and energy related research.
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Development of specific parts of the power transmission infrastructure
Debates about the need for new cross-border electricity exchange capacity in specific
bottlenecks of the European grid date back to policy papers from 1988 (European
Commission 1988, p. 28), and the endorsement of a limited number of so called high
priority trans-European projects for rapid implementation in 1994 (European Council
1994). At that time it remained, however, unclear how to stimulate private investments
in these projects. Thus a debate began about the best lever for public intervention (see
European Commission 1993, p. 79; and European Council 1994, p. 27). In 1996 member
states agreed on a mix of horizontal and sector-specific measures for a number of
infrastructure projects (Decision 1254/96/EC).23
This trans-European energy network programme (TEN-E) lists four Priority Electricity
Corridors of European interest (Regulation No 347/2013, Annex I), for example the
Northern Seas offshore grid or the North-South electricity interconnections in Central
Eastern and Southern Europe. Particular projects within these corridors such as highvoltage overhead transmission lines are labelled as being of common interest are
provided with priority status that entitles them for administrative and financial support.
In sum 66 power infrastructure projects fall into this category, most of which are
transmission infrastructure projects (European Commission 2013a).
With better financing towards decarbonisation?
The EU programmes described above do not yet seem powerful enough to stimulate the
development of a power transmission system that is capable of integrating large
numbers of renewables and suitable for the aims of decarbonisation; much remains
hence to be done (Monti 2010, p. 48). Repeated focuses on specific projects on a bottomup basis has been blamed for limited progress (Helm 2014), yet EU policy towards
individual grid development projects changed in the second half of the 2000s, and seems
to be on the way towards somewhat more of a top-down approach. TEN-E, for example,
today is characterised by a distinct top-down approach (Agt 2011, pp. 28-29).
Moreover, grid development seems to suffer from the open question how to organise
markets in a way investors can have confidence that costs will be recovered (Helm 2014,
pp. 30-31). The European Commission therefore called for a new approach to the

TEN-E has a strong focus on market integration, but cross-border power interconnection projects that
contribute to the integration of renewables, are also included (see Regulation No 347/2013, Article 4 and
Annex IV).
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planning and construction of electricity transmission infrastructure projects (European
Commission 2010). In this context it seems that the European Union is increasingly
inclined to (co-) finance or guarantee the financing of infrastructure projects of
European interest (Agt 2011, p. 29). With the European Energy Programme for
Recovery, for example, the EU channelled financial resources from its budget directly to
selected energy infrastructure projects (European Commission 2013b).24
Increasing certainty for investment and innovation (in grids) is one of the key elements
of this new focus on financial support (European Commission 2011b). The Connecting
Europe Facility (CEF) is the latest result of this approach (Regulation 1316/2013). With
a multiannual budget of 5.85 billion EUR this new institution supports implementation
of energy infrastructure projects defined as common interest (Regulation 1316/2013,
Article 5). This support will mostly be granted in form of so called risk sharing
instruments for project companies which are supposed to make loans to interconnection
projects cheaper by alleviating some of the risk for the lenders by giving loan guarantees
(Annex I, Part 2). In fall 2014, for example, the European Commission has allocated 647
million Euros for this purpose.
The Connecting Europe Facility hence aims at reducing the financial risks for certain
infrastructure projects. According to the assessment of the European Commission, this
latest trend in EU infrastructure policy resulted in progress towards an integrated
internal energy market, but additional infrastructure needs to be built (European
Commission 2014b). A part of the Commission’s infrastructure investment package from
autumn 2014 is intended to function in the same direction: to help building
transmission infrastructure through giving access to cheap loans and guarantees.
Lately, grid infrastructure has crept up the EU agenda. Free flow of energy is mentioned
as a fifth freedom in the press release on the Energy Union (European Commission
2015b). Moreover, in the communication the same day connected to the Energy Union,
energy infrastructure is highlighted as a vital part of the Energy Union: ‘There are
missing interconnection links between several countries. Building these
interconnections will require the mobilisation of all efforts at all levels, as a
matter of urgency, to achieve the common objective of a fully functioning and
connected internal energy market’ (European Commission 2015a, 2).
With a financial framework of 904 million EUR for grid interconnection measures and 565 million EUR
for offshore wind energy24, the integration of invested sums are considerable compared to the financial
resources of the TEN-E programme, which has only a limited financial component.
24
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4. Exploring the geo-economic consequences of EU decarbonisation
policy
Despite their 25 years of history, their diversity and considerable financial means, the
European policies and programmes described above have not yet stimulated the
development of an integrated European power system that could serve as the technical
basis for a decarbonised power sector sufficiently. The question is, why? Given that EU
decarbonisation policy and the underlying policies to adapt the European power system
will put pressure on the geographic allocation of electricity generation, transmission and
storage infrastructure capacity in Europe, the difficulties become clearer: If fully
implemented, EU decarbonisation policy may put energy assets (conventional as well as
renewable) of individual member states ‘at risk’.
Europe’s decarbonisation agenda is thus likely to have considerable geo-economical
long-term implications such as the following:


With increasing market integration come larger transmission distances, new
markets with new competitors, and hence new competition between utilities and
other producers



Traditional coal, nuclear and gas power plants face new competition from
renewables in their home markets and from abroad



New renewable based electricity generation capacity will be located differently
than fossil and nuclear plants



With the changing location the question arises what the suitable interconnection
and storage services are



Diversification towards new supplier countries and energy sources brings new
trade routes and infrastructure such as LNG harbours, and with them new
electricity and potentially also gas grids

Electricity generation capacity in Europe will therefore see a profound reshuffling in the
coming decades as a result of the EU decarbonisation agenda. The following sections
explore in more detail the geo-economical frictions that might follow the
implementation of those policies the European decarbonisation agenda is based on, and
what political concerns may be expected to arise between EU member states in the
future. The question is: What are the potential EU specific geo-economical implications
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of the combined effect of market integration, the transition to renewable energy, and
supply diversification on the structure of electricity transmission and – as a result – the
allocation of generation capacity in the EU?

4.1 Market integration
From a national perspective market integration implies that the interconnection
capacity (shortage) along borders will cease to protect domestic markets from foreign
competition; new competitors to domestic producers will emerge, and electricity
companies which are not efficient enough at adapting to competition on a European
market will get into trouble, while other producers/utilities (including foreign) will be
able to strengthen their market position. Moreover, a successful EU market integration
policy will increase the likelihood for countries to let their electricity be produced
elsewhere, thus letting generation capacity to ‘migrate’ beyond national borders.
The variety of regulatory frameworks in the states in Europe does, however, hinder a
more European development. It is very likely that one reason behind this situation is,
that EU member states are more than aware that European network and market
optimization will produce winners and losers on the member state level. Countries,
industries and regions expecting to lose production capacity will thus be satisfied with
the lack of progress to increase cross-border power exchange capacity. If every country
has some winners and losers (companies, industries, or regions) it matters little. But
what if, in an extreme case, a substantial part of energy production moves from one part
of Europe to another?

4.2 Renewable transition
The promotion and integration of renewables implies three important changes to the
European power system:
First, every country or region has access to at least some form and amount of renewable
sources of energy; yet some countries are better qualified to become competitive
producers than others, because renewable energy sources are denser at certain
locations, and the technological and economical capabilities for their exploitation differ.
Production will therefore shift to those countries that have access to better and more
sources of renewable energy, offer better incentives for expanding capacity, and can
exploit them more cost-efficiently. As a result, countries which decide to exploit their
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own renewable sources to cover their consumption will (potentially) become (more)
self-reliant, with the need for cross-border energy trade (potentially) becoming smaller.
Other countries might prefer to import energy, i.e. to buy from EU energy and power
markets. As a consequence, their strategic focus will shift from the access on overseas
fossil fuel resources towards the ownership, management, and protection of grids (and
other supply routes for renewables) in order to secure electricity imports.
Second, renewable generation such as wind and solar is of an intermittent nature. Large
scale adaptation of the power transmission infrastructure are necessary to harness
renewable energy sources such as wind and solar. Increasing the use of this form of
power generation in one part of Europe therefore implies also growing balancing costs
elsewhere. Moreover, countries that feature cheap balancing services (e.g. dispatchable
hydropower or other storage means), standing reserves, interconnector capacity, or
renewables that can deliver in times of peak demand, will potentially gain influence over
neighbouring countries. Without a clear regulatory framework that clarifies costs and
benefits of renewable electricity generation and transport, conflicts may arise. This will
potentially be an interesting case for EU legal scholars, legal experts in the Commission
and in the member states to discuss in the years to come.
Third, renewable electricity implies distributed generation in so called combined power
stations. Contrary to today’s big, centralized fossil fuel or nuclear power plants, this form
of power generation hence allows for a business model that brings together a larger
number of smaller generation units dispersed over larger territories. Where the option
of distributed generation is chosen, energy markets become rather locally oriented, and
are likely to involve a mix of private and communal companies. Regions/countries with
a focus on this business model would hence be less present on the integrated EU market.
Decentralised power systems could therefore be an interesting way to protect particular
industries from the competitive pressures of European markets.

4.3 Supply diversification
The transition to a more renewable energy system, has already been discussed in depth.
Thus, we will focus on two other issues:
First, external relations between supplier and transit countries outside the EU.
Diversification away from Russian and Middle Eastern gas dependence towards other
regions and suppliers will potentially lead to altered entry points to the European
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energy system, for example new LNG capacity; gas grid capacity in those regions will
hence have to be increased. Given that the integration of European energy markets
proceeds, power generation and transmission capacity might follow these changes.
Member states in risk of losing power generation to regions closer to new entry points
are thus likely to oppose further steps in such a direction. Another example would be
potential solar PV imports from North Africa which would necessitate new HVDC and
interconnector capacity at the Southern European border; however member states
which are located too far away to benefit from potentially lower electricity tariffs in the
Southern regions might feel inclined to oppose the use of European funds to stimulate
the construction of the necessary power transmission infrastructure.
Second, stimulating the construction of inter-member state transmission infrastructure
is main part of EU’s policy on supply diversification. Common grid planning and Projects
of Common Interest for electricity and gas grids are two important instruments in this
regard. Yet more interconnection capacity would not only increase the ability to secure
and stabilise power supply, but (as in the case of market integration) also contribute to
shifts in power generation capacity. Supply diversification through more cross-border
interconnection capacity hence implies increased dependency on the will and the
capability of (power and grid companies in) neighbouring countries to uphold and
stabilize electricity supply. Moreover, the stimulation of interconnectors is currently
pursued without a single clear legal framework for such an integrated market.
Potentially the EU’s internal approach to supply diversification therefore opens the door
to continuous fears about the reliability of neighbouring countries. Clear agreements
and regulations are therefore necessary to avoid mistrust among member states.
Otherwise solidarity on this field will remain a somewhat ‘unfirm’ concept.

5. Breaking the state-company axis with refined instruments?
Decarbonisation with today’s technologies equals a massive increase of carbon-neutral
renewables. Given the technological and economic dynamics in the power system
caused by these renewables, decarbonisation goes beyond the mere replacement of old
power generation units with new ones, but depends largely on the adaptation and
integration of yet largely isolated or semi-integrated power pools in Europe. Despite
some first positive results, the European decarbonisation agenda will therefore soon
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reach a crucial point, where the growing numbers of renewables demand a fundamental
adaptation of the power system to their technical and economic needs.

5.1 Synopsis
The EU has implemented policies to adapt the power system to growing numbers of
renewables, yet as seen in the sections above, this agenda largely relies on older
competencies, policies, programmes and instruments (market integration, increase of
renewables, supply diversification, stimulation of cross-border integration of power
grids). The attempt to focus these on the goal of a near-to-carbon neutral power sector
can be considered to be incomplete, because it avoids answers to the inconvenient truth
that EU’s decarbonisation agenda and its underlying elements contribute to changes in
the topography of the power system: Better integrated markets and new transmission
and supply lines allow new (renewable) power generation capacity to migrate to, and
cluster together at sites where conditions are more favourable. And these are not
necessarily located where power generation is located today.
Historically the relocation of power generation to new places, and dependency on
neighbouring regions is of course nothing out of the ordinary. But while today’s
electricity systems have been built around consumption centres, with a limited number
of central generation plants in a given region, benefits of European integration become
more significant when new generation is less well located for demand (Newbery et al.
2013, p. 12). In other words: If European policies succeed to increase interconnection
capacity between the different elements of the European system, proximity of power
generation to consumption centres will be increasingly less important, dependency on
other regions will therefore much more often include a cross-border context than it is
the case today.
The North Sea region, for example, is in the process of becoming a hotspot for power
generation from renewable sources, and the better integrated the European system is,
the more power generation sites can operate there; other regions with less promising
RE sources (and/or in member states without the will or means to exploit them) will
lose this generation capacity, and be dependent in their power supply. Decarbonisation
policy hence involves substantial geo-economical frictions, as member states have some
reasons to worry about their relative position in the emerging European power system
(see section 3.3). Europe’s decarbonisation agenda thus implies the acceptance of the
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involved actors to generate conditions which might lead to the migration of power
generation capacity away from today’s sites and beyond the borders of national control.

5.2 The state-company axis and decarbonisation
Today’s power systems in Europe have been determined by an axis between power
companies and the state which evolved in the second half of the 20th century. If Europe’s
power sector is to be decarbonised by 2050, a policy framework is needed which allows
the evolution of the power transmission system to follow changes in power generation.
Given the lack of progress with regard to the integration of power pools necessary for
decarbonisation, it would seem that the state-company axis is still intact at many places.
Where, on the other hand, high levels of power system integration already exist, one can
infer not only high levels of mutual trust between the involved nations (as in
Scandinavia), but also a distinctive political will to implement a policy that will
ultimately increase dependency on others (as in the case of Germany and The
Netherlands). Strong integration, moreover, indicates an orientation at the generally
beneficial role of market forces, as interconnection opens the door to more competition
between power companies.
But while EU policies are aiming at the modernisation of Europe’s power system,
member states have enough reasons to worry about their relative position in the
emerging European energy system: Bigger markets, growing transmission capacities,
new (renewable) energy carriers, and new supply routes represent greatly altered
framework conditions for the future evolution of the power system. The geo-economical
frictions resulting from EU’s decarbonisation policies would probably be negligible if the
balance between winners and losers were approximately equal in all EU member states,
and if the regulatory framework established a level playing field for all market players
which promises an overall net gain. Yet, not every country is likely to benefit equally
from changes involved with a European power system such as the relocation of power
generation capacity and the accompanying infrastructure effects.
In short, the EU policies discussed above will cause increased economic activity in some
countries, whereas others will lose parts of their power industry, and hence produce
winners and losers. To us, it therefore seems likely that member states will consider
increased participation in the EU power market as a matter of strategic choice: Even
though large parts of the electricity generated in Europe might one day be transmitted
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through a truly European grid system, governments will attempt to keep self-provision
for areas of vital state interests and economic reasons, while local communities may
desire to become self-sufficient in their power supply.

5.3 Recommendations
As the paper shows, an integrated European power system would be strongly beneficial
to reach the goals of the decarbonisation agenda. But even though diverse EU
programmes indicate that an increasing number of actors are orientated at a European
development, others appear to remain reluctant to either face competition on a
European market or losing control over national energy assets. The question thus is,
whether those instruments the EU has at hands are capable of fully bridging and
overcoming those concerns on the national level which counteract such a European
development.
EU policies to develop the European power system towards the large-scale integration
of renewables have to take this into account: Integration of power systems will only
occur if European policies are designed to balance the geo-economical frictions caused
by the European energy transition towards more renewables. To make it from policy
papers to reality, decarbonisation by means power system integration therefore
requires:


Generally high levels of mutual trust, and of the political will to overcome the
economic antagonisms that might constitute an impediment for more integration
and shifting generation capacities.

Thus, clear agreements to cover the commodity and monetary flows seem a prerequisite
in order to avoid opportunistic behaviour and conflicts. One vital element for Europe’s
decarbonisation agenda to be successful therefore is:


A regulatory framework that eases geo-economical concerns of member states
through governance structures such as co-ownership of grid assets or co-decision
making of grid operations, whether at the company level, between two countries,
several countries or countries or on the EU level.

Such a framework needs to find answers to the following questions:


What are country obligations to deliver?
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Who finances projects and where are production and storage facilities to be
located?



Who is going to be the main responsible for operations and disturbance
response?



How to manage the intermittency of power generation in cross-border networks?



How will damages in one area incurred by fluctuating power in another area be
resolved?



What new modes of operating these systems may be required?

If the policies, programmes, and instruments described above do not provide such a
framework, EU’s decarbonisation policy will not be capable of merging power pools in
Europe into a system that can sustain significant numbers of renewables. The overall
picture suggests, however, a rather chaotic development of the European
decarbonisation agenda, and not as much coherence between its underlying policies as
could possibly be achieved. With decarbonisation climbing upwards on the European
agenda, the existing programmes and policies have merely been adapted to include
another end. Synergies are visible, yet a common working framework which successfully
focuses the different policies on the end of a truly European power system, is still largely
missing. Without it, the national state-company axis will remain in place at many places,
thus making Europe’s decarbonisation goals more difficult to achieve. Of course, stateowned companies can also contribute to successful decarbonisation, so, given their
importance in the current energy systems, much will depend on what positions they will
take on the issues at stake.
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